1740
2021年8月31日，ISO國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化組織正式發(fā)布了ISO/SAE 21434：Road vehicles-Cybersecurity engineering（道路車輛 信息安全工程）標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)定義了針對所有車載電子系統(tǒng)、車輛部件、車載軟件及外部網(wǎng)絡(luò)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)信息安全工程設(shè)計實(shí)踐/做法。
標(biāo)準(zhǔn)發(fā)布
標(biāo)準(zhǔn)主要規(guī)定了道路車輛電子電氣系統(tǒng)及其組件和接口在概念、開發(fā)、生產(chǎn)、運(yùn)行、維護(hù)和銷毀階段工程相關(guān)的信息安全風(fēng)險管理要求，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)主要側(cè)重于汽車信息安全流程，并未規(guī)定與信息安全相關(guān)的具體技術(shù)或解決方案。作為當(dāng)前汽車信息安全領(lǐng)域最重要的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之一，其發(fā)布將為汽車全生命周期的信息安全過程管理及信息安全管理體系建設(shè)提供有力支撐。
該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制訂工作自2016年1月30日啟動，2021年8月發(fā)布。由中汽中心牽頭組織行業(yè)專家正在推進(jìn)將ISO/SAE 21434國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)轉(zhuǎn)化為推薦性國家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)《道路車輛 信息安全工程》。該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文件由技術(shù)委員會ISO/TC 22、道路車輛、小組委員會SC 32、電氣和電子部件及通用系統(tǒng)方面以及SAE TEVEES18A車輛信息安全系統(tǒng)工程委員會共同編制。ISO/SAE 21434第一版取消并替代SAE J3061:2016- Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems。
ISO/SAE 21434概述
ISO/SAE 21434概覽
ISO/SAE 21434側(cè)重于汽車電子產(chǎn)品設(shè)計和開發(fā)中的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全風(fēng)險。該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)涵蓋網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全治理和結(jié)構(gòu)、車輛整個生命周期的安全工程以及后期生產(chǎn)安全流程。ISO/SAE 21434的前置ISO標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是ISO 26262“道路車輛-功能安全”。ISO 26262為汽車安全提供了一個生命周期（管理、開發(fā)、生產(chǎn)、經(jīng)營、服務(wù)、報廢）理念，并在這些生命周期階段中提供必要的支持。該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)涵蓋功能性安全方面的整體開發(fā)過程（包括需求規(guī)劃、設(shè)計、實(shí)施、集成、驗(yàn)證、確認(rèn)和配置）。26262不包括軟件開發(fā)或車輛子系統(tǒng)，也不包括如何處理網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全事件。ISO/SAE 21434涵蓋了網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全的各個方面——從車輛的初始設(shè)計到報廢。供應(yīng)鏈也包括在汽車生產(chǎn)的每個步驟中。ISO/SAE 21434涵蓋了連接車輛生命周期的所有階段，包括電氣和電子系統(tǒng)，包括其部件和接口，包括：• 設(shè)計與工程• 生產(chǎn)• 客戶操作• 維修保養(yǎng)• 報廢這種網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全管理的生命周期方法使ISO/SAE 21434成為連接車輛網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全最全面的方法之一。
對汽車原始設(shè)備制造商和開發(fā)商的影響
任何制造商、開發(fā)人員或OEM都應(yīng)考慮積極地將ISO/SAE 21434集成到其當(dāng)前的生產(chǎn)過程中。新標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的主要關(guān)注點(diǎn)是網(wǎng)絡(luò)信息安全。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的重點(diǎn)是通過規(guī)范制造商測試其產(chǎn)品的方式，為汽車消費(fèi)者提供更好的安全性。
ISO/SAE 21434要求制造商和開發(fā)商進(jìn)行風(fēng)險評估。在識別風(fēng)險之前，廠商需要知道是什么導(dǎo)致了風(fēng)險。評估將識別可能容易受到攻擊的任何組件、API或軟件功能。完成評估后，應(yīng)識別漏洞。
對汽車開發(fā)商和制造商的影響是，他們可以生產(chǎn)在發(fā)布前經(jīng)過測試的應(yīng)用程序和組件，這有利于駕駛員和他們的安全。
標(biāo)準(zhǔn)也與其他框架一起工作：在ISO/SAE 21434的情況下，NIST SP-800—30和StAMARDISO/IEC 31010可用于使用嘗試和測試的方法建立風(fēng)險評估的基礎(chǔ)。
ISO/SAE 21434標(biāo)準(zhǔn)由汽車?yán)嫦嚓P(guān)者引入，以解決連接帶來的安全問題。該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為強(qiáng)化安全性提供了一個框架，促進(jìn)使用更理想的方法構(gòu)建更安全的車輛。
ISO/SAE 21434:2021標(biāo)準(zhǔn)簡介
(一)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)一般信息
狀態(tài)：已發(fā)布發(fā)布日期：2021-08版本：第1版頁數(shù)：81頁技術(shù)委員會：ISO/TC 22/SC 32 Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects（電氣和電子元件及一般系統(tǒng)相關(guān)）
(二)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的目的
本文件闡述了道路車輛電氣和電子（E/E）系統(tǒng)工程中的信息安全觀點(diǎn)。通過確保對信息安全的適當(dāng)考慮，本文件旨在使電子/電子系統(tǒng)工程跟上最先進(jìn)的技術(shù)和不斷發(fā)展的攻擊方法。本文檔提供了與信息安全工程相關(guān)的詞匯、目標(biāo)、要求和準(zhǔn)則，作為整個供應(yīng)鏈中共同理解的基礎(chǔ)。這使組織能夠：•定義信息安全政策和流程；•管理信息安全風(fēng)險；•培養(yǎng)信息安全文化。本文件可用于實(shí)施信息安全管理系統(tǒng)，包括信息安全風(fēng)險管理。
(三)本文件的組織
圖1給出了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文檔結(jié)構(gòu)的概述。圖1的元素沒有規(guī)定各個主題的執(zhí)行順序。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文件概述
第4條（一般注意事項(xiàng)）僅供參考，包括本文件中道路車輛信息安全工程方法的背景和觀點(diǎn)。
第5條（組織信息安全管理）包括組織信息安全政策、規(guī)則和流程的信息安全管理和規(guī)范。
第6條（項(xiàng)目相關(guān)信息安全管理）包括項(xiàng)目層面的信息安全管理和信息安全活動。
第7條（分布式信息安全活動）包括在客戶和供應(yīng)商之間分配信息安全活動責(zé)任的要求。
第8條（持續(xù)信息安全活動）包括為持續(xù)風(fēng)險評估提供信息的活動，并定義了在信息安全支持結(jié)束前電子/電子系統(tǒng)的脆弱性管理（vulnerability management）。
第9條（概念）包括確定項(xiàng)目信息安全風(fēng)險、信息安全目標(biāo)和信息安全要求的活動。
第10條（產(chǎn)品開發(fā)）包括定義信息安全規(guī)范、實(shí)施和驗(yàn)證信息安全要求的活動。
第11條（信息安全驗(yàn)證）包括車輛級項(xiàng)目的信息安全驗(yàn)證。
第12條（生產(chǎn)）包括物品或組件制造和組裝的信息安全相關(guān)方面。
第13條（操作和維護(hù)）包括與信息安全事件響應(yīng)和項(xiàng)目或組件更新相關(guān)的活動。
第14條（結(jié)束信息安全支持及報廢）包括結(jié)束項(xiàng)目或組件支持和報廢的信息安全考慮因素。
第15條（威脅分析和風(fēng)險評估方法）包括模塊化的分析和評估方法，以確定信息安全風(fēng)險的程度，從而采取措施。
第5條至第15條有自己的目標(biāo)、規(guī)定（即要求、建議、許可）和工作成果（work products）。工作成果是滿足一個或多個相關(guān)要求的信息安全活動的結(jié)果。
“先決條件”是由前一階段的工作成果組成的強(qiáng)制性輸入，“進(jìn)一步支持信息”是指可以考慮的信息，可由有別于信息安全活動負(fù)責(zé)人的來源提供。
條款和工作成果被分配唯一標(biāo)識符，由兩個字母的縮寫（“RQ”表示要求，“RC”表示建議，“PM”表示許可，“WP”表示工作成果）組成，后跟兩個數(shù)字，用連字符分隔。第一個數(shù)字表示該條款，第二個數(shù)字分別表示該條款的條款或工作成果的連續(xù)順序。例如，[RQ-05-14]指第5條中的第14條規(guī)定，這是一項(xiàng)要求。
(四)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)目錄
| 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)目錄 | （參考譯文） |
| Foreword | 前言 |
| Introduction | 介紹 |
| 1 Scope | 1范圍 |
| 2 Normative references | 2規(guī)范性引用文件 |
| 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms | 3術(shù)語、定義和縮略語 |
| 3.1 Terms and definitions | 3.1術(shù)語和定義 |
| 3.2 Abbreviated terms | 3.2縮略語 |
| 4 General considerations | 4總體考慮 |
| 5 Organizational cybersecurity management | 5組織信息安全管理 |
| 5.1 General | 5.1通則 |
| 5.2 Objectives | 5.2目標(biāo) |
| 5.3 Inputs | 5.3輸入 |
| 5.4 Requirements and recommendations | 5.4要求和建議 |
| 5.5 Work products | 5.5工作產(chǎn)品（成果） |
| 6 Project dependent cybersecurity management | 6項(xiàng)目相關(guān)信息安全管理 |
| 6.1 General | 6.1通則 |
| 6.2 Objectives | 6.2目標(biāo) |
| 6.3 Inputs | 6.3輸入 |
| 6.4 Requirements and recommendations | 6.4要求和建議 |
| 6.5 Work products | 6.5工作成果 |
| 7 Distributed cybersecurity activities | 7.分布式信息安全活動 |
| 7.1 General | 7.1通則 |
| 7.2 Objectives | 7.2目標(biāo) |
| 7.3 Inputs | 7.3輸入 |
| 7.4 Requirements and recommendations | 7.4要求和建議 |
| 7.5 Work products | 7.5工作成果 |
| 8 Continual cybersecurity activities | 8持續(xù)信息安全活動 |
| 8.1 General | 8.1通則 |
| 8.2 Objectives | 8.2目標(biāo) |
| 8.3 Cybersecurity monitoring | 8.3信息安全監(jiān)控 |
| 8.4 Cybersecurity event evaluation | 8.4信息安全事件評估 |
| 8.5 Vulnerability analysis | 8.5漏洞分析 |
| 8.6 Vulnerability management | 8.6漏洞管理 |
| 9 Concept | 9概念 |
| 9.1 General | 9.1通則 |
| 9.2 Objectives | 9.2目標(biāo) |
| 9.3 Item definition | 9.3項(xiàng)目定義 |
| 9.4 Cybersecurity goals | 9.4信息安全目標(biāo) |
| 9.5 Cybersecurity concept | 9.5信息安全概念 |
| 10 Product development | 10 產(chǎn)品開發(fā) |
| 10.1 General | 10.1通則 |
| 10.2 Objectives | 10.2目標(biāo) |
| 10.3 Inputs | 10.3輸入 |
| 10.4 Requirements and recommendations | 10.4要求和建議 |
| 10.5 Work products | 10.5工作產(chǎn)品 |
| 11 Cybersecurity validation | 11信息安全驗(yàn)證 |
| 11.1 General | 11.1通則 |
| 11.2 Objectives | 11.2目標(biāo) |
| 11.3 Inputs | 11.3輸入 |
| 11.4 Requirements and recommendations | 11.4要求和建議 |
| 11.5 Work products | 11.5工作產(chǎn)品 |
| 12 Production | 12生產(chǎn) |
| 12.1 General | 12.1通則 |
| 12.2 Objectives | 12.2目標(biāo) |
| 12.3 Inputs | 12.3輸入 |
| 12.4 Requirements and recommendations | 12.4要求和建議 |
| 12.5 Work products | 12.5工作產(chǎn)品 |
| 13 Operations and maintenance | 13運(yùn)行和維護(hù) |
| 13.1 General | 13.1通則 |
| 13.2 Objectives | 13.2目標(biāo) |
| 13.3 Cybersecurity incident response | 13.3信息安全事件響應(yīng) |
| 13.4 Updates | 13.4更新 |
| 14 End of cybersecurity support and decommissioning | 14信息安全支持結(jié)束和報廢 |
| 14.1 General | 14.1通則 |
| 14.2 Objectives | 14.2目標(biāo) |
| 14.3 End of cybersecurity support | 14.3信息安全支持結(jié)束 |
| 14.4 Decommissioning | 14.4報廢 |
| 15 Threat analysis and risk assessment methods | 15威脅分析和風(fēng)險評估方法 |
| 15.1 General | 15.1通則 |
| 15.2 Objectives | 15.2目標(biāo) |
| 15.3 Asset identification | 15.3資產(chǎn)識別 |
| 15.4 Threat scenario identification | 15.4威脅場景識別 |
| 15.5 Impact rating | 15.5影響等級 |
| 15.6 Attack path analysis | 15.6攻擊路徑分析 |
| 15.7 Attack feasibility rating | 15.7攻擊可行性等級 |
| 15.8 Risk value determination | 15.8風(fēng)險值確定 |
| 15.9 Risk treatment decision | 15.9風(fēng)險處理決策 |
| Annex A Summary of cybersecurity activities and work products | 附錄A 信息安全活動和工作成果概述 |
| A.1 General | A.1概述 |
| A.2 Overview of cybersecurity activities and work products | A.2信息安全活動和工作成果概述 |
| Annex B Examples of cybersecurity culture | 附錄B 信息安全文化示例 |
| Annex C Example of cybersecurity interface agreement template | 附錄C 信息安全接口協(xié)議模板示例 |
| C.1 General | C.1概述 |
| C.2 Example template | C.2示例模板附錄 |
| Annex D Cybersecurity relevance – example methods and criteria | 附件D 信息安全相關(guān)性-示例方法和標(biāo)準(zhǔn) |
| D.1 General | D.1總則 |
| D.2 Methods | D.2方法 |
| Annex E Cybersecurity assurance levels | 附件E 網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全保證分級 |
| E.1 General | E.1總則 |
| E.2 Determining a CAL | E.2確定CAL |
| E.3 Using a CAL | E.3使用CAL |
| Annex F Guidelines for impact rating | 附件F 影響評級指南 |
| F.1 General | F.1總則 |
| F.2 Impact rating for safety damage | F.2安全損傷的沖擊等級 |
| F.3 Impact rating for financial damage | F.3財務(wù)損失的影響評級 |
| F.4 Impact rating for operational damage | F.4操作損傷的沖擊等級 |
| F.5 Impact rating for privacy damage | F.5隱私損害的影響評級附錄 |
| Annex G Guidelines for attack feasibility rating | G 攻擊可行性評級指南 |
| G.1 General | G.1概述 |
| G.2 Guidelines for the attack potential-based approach | G.2基于攻擊潛力的方法指南 |
| G.3 Guidelines for the CVSS-based approach | G.3基于CVSS的方法指南 |
| G.4 Guidelines for the attack vector-based approach | G.4基于攻擊向量的方法指南 |
| Annex H Examples of application of TARA methods – headlamp system | 附錄H TARA方法應(yīng)用示例-前照燈系統(tǒng) |
| H.1 General | H.1通則 |
| H.2 Example activities for concept phase of a headlamp system | H.2前照燈系統(tǒng)概念階段的活動示例 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 參考文獻(xiàn) |
(五)圖目錄
| 圖目錄 | （參考譯文） |
| Figure 1 — Overview of this document | 圖1-本文件概述 |
| Figure 2 — Overall cybersecurity risk management | 圖2-總體信息安全風(fēng)險管理 |
| Figure 3 — Relationship between item, function, component and related terms | 圖3-事項(xiàng)、功能、組件和相關(guān)術(shù)語之間關(guān)系 |
| Figure 4 — Cybersecurity governance | 圖4-信息安全治理 |
| Figure 5 — Integration of off-the-shelf and out-of-context components | 圖5-現(xiàn)有組件和非關(guān)聯(lián)組件的集成 |
| Figure 6 — Reuse analysis examples | 圖6-重用分析示例 |
| Figure 7 — Cybersecurity assessment in relation to other cybersecurity activities | 圖7-與其他信息安全活動相關(guān)的信息安全評估 |
| Figure 8 — Use cases for customer/supplier relationships in the supply chain | 圖8-供應(yīng)鏈中客戶/供應(yīng)商關(guān)系的用例 |
| Figure 9 — Example of product development activities in the V-model | 圖9-V型模型中的產(chǎn)品開發(fā)活動示例 |
| Figure C.1 — Example of a cybersecurity interface agreement template | 圖C.1-信息安全接口協(xié)議模板示例 |
| Figure D.1 — Cybersecurity relevance example method and criteria | 圖D.1-信息安全相關(guān)性示例方法和標(biāo)準(zhǔn) |
| Figure E.1 — Relationship between a CAL and risk | 圖E.1-CAL和風(fēng)險之間的關(guān)系 |
| Figure H.1 — Interactions in concept phase | 圖H.1-概念階段的交互 |
| Figure H.2 — Example of item boundary and preliminary architecture of the headlamp system | 圖H.2-項(xiàng)目邊界和初步架構(gòu)-前照燈系統(tǒng) |
(六)表目錄
| 表目錄 | （參考譯文） |
| Table G.1 — Elapsed time | G.1-經(jīng)過時間 |
| Table G.2 — Specialist expertise | G.2-專家專業(yè)知識 |
| Table G.3 — Knowledge of the item or component | G.3-項(xiàng)目或組件知識 |
| Table G.4 — Window of opportunity | G.4-機(jī)會窗口 |
| Table G.5 — Equipment | G.5-設(shè)備 |
| Table G.6 — Example aggregation of attack potential | G.6-潛在攻擊聚合示例 |
| Table G.7 — Example attack potential mapping | G.7-潛在攻擊映射示例 |
| Table G.8 — Example CVSS exploitability mapping | G.8-CVSS可利用性映射示例 |
| Table G.9 — Attack vector-based approach | G.9-基于攻擊向量的方法 |
| Table H.1 — Example description of the operational environment | H.1-操作環(huán)境的示例說明 |
| Table H.2 — Example list of assets and damage scenarios | H.2-資產(chǎn)和損害場景的示例列表 |
| Table H.3 — Example of impact ratings for damage scenarios | H.3-損害場景的影響評級示例 |
| Table H.4 — Example threat scenarios | H.4-威脅場景示例 |
| Table H.5 — Example attack paths for threat scenarios | H.5-威脅場景的攻擊路徑示例 |
| Table H.6 — Examples of attack feasibility rating with the attack vector-based approach | H.6-基于攻擊向量方法的攻擊可行性示例評級 |
| Table H.7 — Examples of attack feasibility rating with the attack potential-based approach | H.7-基于攻擊潛力方法的攻擊可行性評級示例 |
| Table H.8 — Risk matrix example | H.8-風(fēng)險矩陣示例 |
| Table H.9 — Examples of determined risk values | H.9-確定的風(fēng)險值示例 |
| Table H.10 — Example translation of impact and attack feasibility to numerical values | H.10-影響和攻擊可行性轉(zhuǎn)換為數(shù)值的示例 |
(七)部分標(biāo)準(zhǔn)內(nèi)容（譯文僅供參考）：
1.范圍本文件規(guī)定了有關(guān)道路車輛電氣和電子（E/E：electrical and electronic）系統(tǒng)（包括其部件和接口）的概念、產(chǎn)品開發(fā)、生產(chǎn)、操作、維護(hù)和報廢的信息安全風(fēng)險管理（cybersecurity risk management）工程要求。
定義了一個框架，其中包括信息安全流程的要求以及溝通和管理信息安全風(fēng)險的通用語言。
本文件適用于在本文件出版后開始開發(fā)或修改的系列生產(chǎn)道路車輛E/E系統(tǒng)，包括其部件和接口。
本文件未規(guī)定與信息安全相關(guān)的具體技術(shù)或解決方案。
2.規(guī)范性引用文件?ISO 26262-3:2018，Road vehicles — Functional safety — Part 3: Concept phase（道路車輛-功能安全-第3部分：概念階段）
3.術(shù)語、定義和縮寫術(shù)語/Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms
3.1術(shù)語和定義在本文件中，適用以下術(shù)語和定義。ISO和IEC在以下地址維護(hù)用于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的術(shù)語數(shù)據(jù)庫：•ISO在線瀏覽平臺：https://www.iso.org/obp•IEC電子百科全書：https://www.electropedia.org/
3.1.1
architectural design
representation that allows for identification of components (3.1.7), their boundaries, interfaces and interactions
3.1.2
asset
object that has value, or contributes to value
Note 1 to entry: An asset has one or more cybersecurity properties (3.1.20) whose compromise can lead to one or more damage scenarios (3.1.22).
3.1.3
attack feasibility
attribute of an attack path (3.1.4) describing the ease of successfully carrying out the corresponding set of actions
3.1.4
attack path
attack
set of deliberate actions to realize a threat scenario (3.1.33)
3.1.5
attacker
person, group, or organization that carries out an attack path (3.1.4)
3.1.6
audit
examination of a process to determine the extent to which the process objectives are achieved
[SOURCE: ISO 26262-1:2018 [1], 3.5, modified — The phrase “with regard to” was substituted by "to determine the extent to which" and "are achieved" was added.]
3.1.7
component
part that is logically and technically separable
3.1.8
customer
person or organization that receives a service or product
[SOURCE: ISO 9000:2015 [2], 3.2.4, modified — The phrase “could or does receive” was replaced by “receives”, the phrase “that is intended for or required by this person or organization” was omitted, and the example and note 1 to entry were omitted.]
3.1.9
cybersecurity
road vehicle cybersecurity
condition in which assets (3.1.2) are sufficiently protected against threat scenarios (3.1.33) to items (3.1.25) of road vehicles, their functions and their electrical or electronic components (3.1.7)
Note 1 to entry: In this document, for the sake of brevity, the term cybersecurity is used instead of road vehicle cybersecurity.
3.1.10
cybersecurity assessment
judgement of cybersecurity (3.1.9)
3.1.11
cybersecurity case
structured argument supported by evidence to state that risks (3.1.29) are not unreasonable
3.1.12
cybersecurity claim
statement about a risk (3.1.29)
Note 1 to entry: The cybersecurity claim can include a justification for retaining or sharing the risk.
3.1.13
cybersecurity concept
cybersecurity requirements of the item (3.1.25) and requirements on the operational environment (3.1.26), with associated information on cybersecurity controls (3.1.14)
3.1.14
cybersecurity control
measure that is modifying risk (3.1.29)
[SOURCE: ISO 31000:2018 [3], 3.8, modified — The word "cybersecurity" was added to the term, the phrase “maintains and/or” was deleted, the notes to entry were deleted.]
3.1.15
cybersecurity event
cybersecurity information (3.1.18) that is relevant for an item (3.1.25) or component (3.1.7)
3.1.16
cybersecurity goal
concept-level cybersecurity requirement associated with one or more threat scenarios (3.1.33)
3.1.17
cybersecurity incident
situation in the field that can involve vulnerability (3.1.38) exploitation
3.1.18
cybersecurity information
information with regard to cybersecurity (3.1.9) for which relevance is not yet determined
3.1.19
cybersecurity interface agreement
agreement between customer (3.1.8) and supplier concerning distributed cybersecurity activities (3.1.23)
3.1.20
cybersecurity property
attribute that can be worth protecting
Note 1 to entry: Attributes include confidentiality, integrity and/or availability.
3.1.21
cybersecurity specification
cybersecurity requirements and corresponding architectural design (3.1.1)
3.1.22
damage scenario
adverse consequence involving a vehicle or vehicle function and affecting a road user (3.1.31)
3.1.23
distributed cybersecurity activities
cybersecurity activities for the item (3.1.25) or component (3.1.7) whose responsibilities are distributed between customer (3.1.8)and supplier
3.1.24
impact
estimate of magnitude of damage or physical harm from a damage scenario (3.1.22)
3.1.25
item
component or set of components (3.1.7) that implements a function at the vehicle level
Note 1 to entry: A system can be an item if it implements a function at the vehicle level, otherwise it is a component.
[SOURCE: ISO 26262-1:2018 [1], 3.8, modified — The term “system” has been replaced by “component”, the phrases “to which ISO 26262 is applied” and “or part of a function” have been omitted and the Note 1 to entry has been replaced.]
3.1.26
operational environment
context considering interactions in operational use
Note 1 to entry: Operational use of an item (3.1.25) or a component (3.1.7) can include use in a vehicle function, in production, and/or in service and repair.
3.1.27
out-of-context
not developed in the context of a specific item (3.1.25)
EXAMPLE:
Processing unit with assumed cybersecurity requirements to be integrated in different items.
3.1.28
penetration testing
cybersecurity testing in which real-world attacks are mimicked to identify ways to compromise cybersecurity goals (3.1.16)
3.1.29
risk
cybersecurity risk
effect of uncertainty on road vehicle cybersecurity (3.1.9) expressed in terms of attack feasibility (3.1.3) and impact (3.1.24)
3.1.30
risk management
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk (3.1.29)
[SOURCE: ISO 31000:2018 [3], 3.2]
3.1.31
road user
person who uses a road
EXAMPLE:
Passenger, pedestrian, cyclist, motorist, or vehicle owner.
3.1.32
tailor,verb
to omit or perform an activity in a different manner compared to its description in this document
3.1.33
threat scenario
potential cause of compromise of cybersecurity properties (3.1.20) of one or more assets (3.1.2) in order to realize a damage scenario (3.1.22)
3.1.34
triage
analysis to determine the relevance of cybersecurity information (3.1.18) to an item (3.1.25) or component (3.1.7)
3.1.35
trigger
criterion for triage (3.1.34)
3.1.36
validation
confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the cybersecurity goals (3.1.16) of the item (3.1.25) are adequate and are achieved
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 [4], 4.1.53, modified — The phrase “requirements for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled” has been replaced by “cybersecurity goals of the item are adequate and are achieved”, note 1 to entry has been omitted.]
3.1.37
verification
confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 [4], 4.1.54, modified — The note 1 to entry has been omitted.]
3.1.38
vulnerability
weakness (3.1.40) that can be exploited as part of an attack path (3.1.4)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018 [5], 3.77, modified — The phrase “of an asset or control” has been omitted; the phrase “by one or more threats” has been replaced by “as part of an attack path”.]
3.1.39
vulnerability analysis
systematic identification and evaluation of vulnerabilities (3.1.38)
3.1.40
weakness
defect or characteristic that can lead to undesirable behaviour
EXAMPLE 1:Missing requirement or specification.
EXAMPLE 2:Architectural or design flaw, including incorrect design of a security protocol.
EXAMPLE 3:Implementation weakness, including hardware and software defect, incorrect implementation of a security protocol.
EXAMPLE 4:Flaw in the operational process or procedure, including misuse and inadequate user training.
EXAMPLE 5:Use of an outdated or deprecated function, including cryptographic algorithms.
3.2縮略語
| 縮略語 | 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)原文英文 | 僅供參考 |
| CAL | cybersecurity assurance level | 信息安全保障級別 |
| CVSS | common vulnerability scoring system | 通用脆弱性評分系統(tǒng) |
| E/E | electrical and electronic | 電氣和電子 |
| ECU | electronic control unit | 電子控制單元 |
| OBD | on-board diagnostic | 車載診斷 |
| OEM | original equipment manufacturer | 原始設(shè)備制造商 |
| PM | permission | 許可 |
| RC | recommendation | 推薦 |
| RQ | requirement | 要求 |
| RASIC | responsible, accountable, supporting, informed, consulted | 責(zé)任、負(fù)責(zé)、支持、知情、咨詢 |
| TARA | threat analysis and risk assessment | 威脅分析和風(fēng)險評估 |
| WP | work product | 工作成果 |
